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FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 1740-1760

By HENRY W. KELLY
CHAPTER V
THE CHURCH-STATE CRISIS *
HE HISTORY of New Mexico from the founding of
T Santa
Fe in 1610 until the panic-stricken exodus of the
1

Spaniards in 1680 was filled with a running quarrel between
the civil and ecclesiastical authorities over the common
ground of mission jurisdiction, a quarrel that from time to
time boiled over, and then subsided to a simmer until the next
crisis gathered force. This futile struggle did much harm,
for the real welfare of the missions was neglected while
padre and governor exhausted themselves in charges and
counter-charges, the framing of long reports and vindicatory
memorials, which showed no trace of compromise, and resulted in little that was constructive. 2
New Mexico in the eighteenth century was, on the
whole, spared the evils of these household quarrels. However, the middle of the century saw a serious flare-up of the
old trouble, the embers of which did not cool for many years
after. In previous chapters on the missionary activities
among the Moquis, Navajos and Apaches, we noticed some
slight intimations that the secular and ecclesiastical powers
were not always smoothly coordinating. The Franciscan
charges that the governors were harming the missionary
program by non-support and positive hostility were only
• Or "The Pot and the Kettle."
1. Lansing B. Bloom, "When was Santa Fe Founded 7" NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL
REVIEW, April, 1929.
2. For a detailed study of the Church-State problem in the seventeenth century
see the following works by France V. Scholes: "Church and State in New Mexico,
1610-1650," Hi8torical Society of New Mexico Publications in Hi8tory, (Albuquerque
1937), VII; "The First Decade of the Inquisition in New Mexico," NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW, July, 1935; "Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670," ibid••
April, 1937; "Problems in the Early Ecclesiastical History of New Mexico," ibid., January, 1932.
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faint echoes of the terrific storm that broke allover the
Custodia in 1749 and 1750.
The governor at the time that this Church-State crisis
came to a head was Tomas Velez Cachupin, and it dragged on
through the terms of his successors, Marin del Valle and
Mateo Antonio de Mendoza. 3 One must keep in mind
throughout this entire controversy that the historian is
unfortunately forced to view matters almost entirely through
the window of a Franciscan convent. The plethora of Franciscan documents on the struggle and the contrasting scarcity of documents showing the secular side of the question
make it difficult to form opinions and pass judgment with
the desirable impartiality.
In 1749 Fray Andres Varo, then an old man, having
come from Spain as a padre in 1718 and having been custodian twice, went to Mexico for the provincial chapter meeting. He wrote, as we have seen, a report in January of that
year concerning the status of the Custodia, followed by another in March of the same year stressing the supreme necessity for a presidio in the Junta de los Rios region. These
reports were presented to the viceroy, and Fray Varo returned to New Mexico, custodian for the third time.
Meanwhile, "the fire of persecution was burning inextinguishably against the religious of the Custodia," led by
Governor Cachupin, whose ire was increased by the knowledge of Varo's two reports. Later in 174-g-the viceroy, as a
result of Varo's reports, sent Don Juan Antonio de Ornedal
y Maza to New Mexico in the official capacities of presidial
inspector and juez de residencia. Ornedal joined the Cachupin faction, and "hell conspired with all its fury to exterminate the religious from the Custodia." Ornedal, in league
with the governor, drew up a very unfavorable report of the
Franciscan administration of the missions, and recommended drastic reforms. In December, 1749, the viceroy sent
to the Franciscan provincia], Jimeno, a certified copy of
3. According to Bloom, "The Governors," 155, the terms of these three governors
were: Tomas Velez Caehupin 1749-1754; Marin del Valle 1754-1760; Mateo Antonio de
Mendoza ad i1\terim governor during 1760.
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Ornedal's slanderous report. The provincial in March, 1750,
replied to the viceroy, refuting piecemeal Ornedal's charges,
at the same time sending the copy of his report to Custodian
Varo, ordering him and the missionaries to reply in detail
to the damning charges. The provincial's somewhat generalized rebuttal would then be bolstered by special facts
from the scene of the trouble. 4
Also in March, 1750, the venerable Fray Carlos Delgado,
then seventy-three years of age, in retirement from active
missionary life at the hospice of Santa Barbara in Mexico
City, wrote a sizzling denunciation of the secular power in
New Mexico. Too old to work any longer in the field, he
wielded a savage pen in defense of his Order. 5
The other principal champion of the brown-robes, Fray
Andres Varo, did as his provincial requested, and in 1751
returned a very bulky collection of documents in defense of
the Order and denouncing the secular power. This collection
included a long, comprehensive report by Varo, supported by
shorter reports by the Vice-Custodian Manuel Trigo and
Frayles Andres Garcia, Juan Sanz de Lezaun, Manuel Vermejo and Juan Jose Oronsoro. The veracity of these reports
was solemnly ratified by numerous attestations "in verbo
sacerdotis." In order doubly to assure the viceroy of the
truth of their statements and to lend an impartial touch, the
padres included the sworn testimonials of numerous prominent colonists praising their unselfish and devoted attention
to duty.
For some reason Jimeno did not send this Varo collection to the viceroy, probably considering them too bulky,
the time inopportune or his own report of 1750 sufficient.
These documents gathered dust for a decade in the archives
of the Franciscan headquarters, the succeeding three provincials failing to make use of them. In 1761 Provincial Serrano,
acting under superior orders, as a result of continued trouble.
in New Mexico, dusted off these reports, written and col4.

Report of Provincial Serrano to Viceroy Cruillas, 1761, Hackett, Historical

Document., III. 479·480.
Ii. Hackett, Histmcal Document., III, 425.
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lected by old Varo ten years before, and made a resume of
them including long quotations from Varo's report, in addition to other letters and reports written by New Mexican
missionaries between 1758 and 1760, which he sent to the
Viceroy Cruillas. 6 I feel that this short description of the
authors, nature and chronology of the numerous reports on
this dispute is valuable in eliminating confusion when they
come up for study in the course of the chapter.
In the first place let us see what Ornedal, the presidial
inspector and judge of residencia, said in his famous report
and what the padres said in self defense. The original report
of Ornedal has not yet been located, but its contents are
known because each charge was minutely listed and refuted
by the Franciscan writers. The padres considered Ornedal
as legally incompetent to make such an all-embracing report,
for he came only as presidial inspector and to take the
residencia of the outgoing Governor Codallos (1743-1749),
having no authority to investigate the conduct of the missionaries. The provincial considered him only as a private,
voluntary informer whose charges were general, unspecific,
contradictory and containing little truth and impartiality.
Ornedal began by charging the missionaries with grave
neglect of their duties, failing to say Mass and administer
the sacraments over long periods of time, and frequently
deserting their posts to indulge in trade for their own benefit.
Secondly, Ornedal charged that, through neglect of the
padres, the Indians had not learned to speak Castilian, although the law provided that they were to be taught, and that
they did not exert themselves to learn the native dialects,
the only real way of effectively Christianizing the Indians.
The Indians usually put off confession until the hour of death
because they naturally disliked having to recount their sins
through an interpreter. Ornedal claimed that the root of the
trouble lay in the disregard that the Franciscan custodians
had for the right of royal patronage enjoyed by the governors. The custodians moved the religious about from mis6.

Hackett, Hi8torical Document., III, 480-481.
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sion to mission, making exchanges or filling vacated posts
without explaining the reason for the change or receiving
the governor's approval. A religious was not allowed to
remain in one place long enough to learn to understand the
native dialect, much less to speak it, with the result that the
padre did not reach his charges effectively.
In the third place, Ornedal accused the missionaries of
searching the houses of the Indians and forcing them to give
up grain that they had stored to feed their own families. The
padres extorted this supply in addition to the swollen harvests that they received from the fields of corn and wheat
that the Indians raised especially for the support of the missionaries. The padres, seizing the Indians' sheep, forced
them to weave fabrics of wool and also of cotton, for which
they received no pay. Ornedal went so far as to say that,
unless virtuous religious were sent to the missions, the
Indians would soon 'flee and join the heathen, for all their
property had been taken.
Fourthly, Ornedal claimed that the padres so neglected
their high calling that they engaged publicly in trade among
themselves and the Indians. The chief articles of trade were
the woolen and cotton cloths that the Inqians wove, and
should they fall short in their quotas the padres would confiscate their buffalo robes and buckskins. If the unhappy
Indians tried to complain to the civil power, they were
threatened with flogging and other dire punishments. The
padres were forced to resort to these objectionable practices
because their annual sinodos arrived greatly curtailed, and
Ornedal advocated as a remedy that the governor distribute
them in the future to insure proper allocation.
Turning from this series of charges, Ornedal, in his fifth
point, became more constructive. He advised that the missions at Santa Fe and EI Paso del Rio del Norte, where the
populations were predominantly Spanish, be taken out
of the hands of the Franciscans and turned into regular
parishes, served by secular priests under the episcopal power
of the bishop of Durango. It was the regular policy through-
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out colonial Spanish America to replace the missionary type
of regular clergy with secular priests when a frontier area
became sufficiently civilized and settled with Spanish colonists and domesticated Indians. The missionary was to
move on into new territory.
Ornedal claimed that both these settlements were prosperous and well established, yielding revenues far in advance
of those needed to support one or more religious.. He claimed
that the obventions in Santa Fe exceeded two thousand pesos,
including what was produced by the pie de tiltar, which consisted of Mass fees contributed annually by the presidial
company. The revenue of El Paso was even greater,
approaching two thousand five hundred pesos. By replacing
the two religious at each villa by one secular priest at each
place, the Hacienda real would be relieved to the amount of
four stipends, for the secular clergy would be supported by
the bishop and the parishioners.
Lastly, Ornedal devoted a large part of his report to a
scheme of retrenchment and consolidation. In order to
ease the burden of the real hacienda, he suggested reducing
the number of religious in the New Mexico missions, having
one padre take care of three neighboring missions, instead of
maintaining one in each mission. The following were the
missions affected, arranged by groups, each group to be
served by one padre.
1. Puxuque [Pojuaque?], Tesuque, Nambe.
2. San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, San Juan de los
Caballeros.
3. Cochiti, San Felipe, Santo Domingo.
4. Santa Ana, Sia, Jemez.
5. Acoma, Laguna.
This plan would release nine missionaries from service, saving the Crown nine sinodos.
Ornedal also advised retrenchment in the EI Paso region
where the four missions of Real de San Lorenzo, Senecu, La
Isleta and El Socorro were situated very close to EI Paso,
the most distant being only four leagues away. The four
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religious should be replaced by one secular priest and two
assistants, or, as an alternative, their number cut down to
one for the four missions. Although Ornedal did not visit the
Junta de los Rios missions, he proposed similar retrenchment
there, one padre to administer all six of the missions. 7
This searing denunciation with its drastic proposals of
secularization and retrenchment aroused a storm of protests
from the Franciscans, the sources, number and chronological order of which have been reviewed above. Consolidating
these various reports, we are given a minute refutation of
each of Ornedal's points, the net result of which is to clear
the Franciscan reputation and show the inadvisability of his
reforms.
The padres vigorously denied the charge that they
neglected their religious duties and frequently deserted their
posts to indulge in trade. The missionaries were men tested
in the zeal and care with which they performed their duties,
and such charges were ridiculous. The only time that a
padre left his post was when he was designated by the custodian, at the governor's request, to accompany the soldiers
and vecinos as royal chaplain on expeditions against the predatory heathen. He also was permitted to leave his post
occasionally for proper and legitimate reasons after authorization from the custodian. In his absence his flock was cared
for by the padre at the nearest mission. Given these restrictions there was no opportunity for the padre to sally forth at
will on commercial enterprises even if he were so inclined.
Fray Varo did not hesitate to admit that, as every human
organization had its flaws, the Franciscan order had its
quota of unworthy members. There were dissolute and ungovernable (relajados y discolos) frayles, those who, overcome by the common inheritance of human frailty, did not
live up to the high ideals of the Order. He mentioned especially "two frayles, who, as men, sinned, but all the frayles
being men are not like those two sinners." On the other hand
7. My authority for OrnedaI's report is the report of Provincial Ximeno to the
Viceroy. March, 1750, Hackett, Historical Documents, UI. 441-456, passim.
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the superior prelates and the custodians took special care to
eliminate the evils and punish the guilty friars, a close watch
being kept on the conduct of all the missionaries. Ornedal
characterized the whole staff of the Custodia by the weaknesses of a.few of its members, and even those discolos were
not guilty of a great many of the charges laid upon them. 8
Ornedal's charge that the padres had not only failed to
teach the Indians Castilian, but had failed to learn the native
dialects, struck at the very foundation of the mission program. If his charge was true, the padres and Indians, being
unable to exchange ideas except through interpreters, the
whole scheme of conversion and instruction was a farce.
There is general agreement among the Franciscan champions that the vast majority of the Indians did understand
Castilian well, and were able to confess in that language, a
condition resulting from the constant diligence of the padres
and the desire of the Indians to learn.
Ornedal's charge "that not a single Indian in any of the
I!1issions, receives during his life any other sacrament than
that of penance and then only at the moment of death and by
an interpreter" was a gross distortion of the truth. He expanded what was an unusual case into a prevalent condition.
Varo admitted that there were a few Indians who stubbornly refused to confess in Spanish, preferring their own
tongue, and it was they whl) would postpone confession until
death using an interpreter. Varo cited the example of one
Indian who appeared eager to become a Christian, made
rapid strides in the instruction, but, when all prepared for
baptism, refused to receive it in spite of all the arguments
and pleadings of the padre. So obdurate was the Indian that
Varo exclaimed in exaggeration, "Heavens, what an Indian!"
(Valgate Dios que Indio!) The Indian held out for years,
yielding only at the approach of death, exclaiming "now's the
time, now's the time, for I am dying." These examples were
the rare exceptions, and most of the Indians confessed at
8. Ximeno Report, 1750, Hackett. Historical Documents, III, 441; Yaro Report.
1751, B. N., Leg. 9, Doc. 17, Folio 13v and 17.
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least once a year, to comply with the precepts of the Church.
The padres did not acquit themselves very well of the
charge of failure to learn the native dialects, of which the
Queres, Tewa and Tigua were predominant. 9 They denied
the truth of Ornedal's charge, but failed to come out with a
strong, positive assertion of their knowledge of the native
tongues, arriving at such a conclusion only by indirection or
inference. Padre Varo probably came nearest to the truth,
yet he was contradictory. He claimed that most of the ministers understood the native dialects, and "more than three"
both understood and spoke them, but that none of them had
a complete mastery, although enough of one to fulfill their
duties. In this "more than three" group was one unnamed
padre who "understands and talks it [the Indian language]
as perfectly as the Indians." We are left with the impression
that this matter of Indian dialects was a sore point with the
padres, an impression that is strengthened by the frequent
references to the use of interpreters. The padres certainly
do not stand acquitted if, out of twenty-five missionaries in
the Santa Fe region of the Custodia, only three or four were
able to understand and speak the native dialects. However,
their assertions that the Indians understood Spanish stands
on firmer ground, and after all it was really more desirable
to make Spanish the common language, for its general usage
would intensify and accelerate the program of conversion
and cultural assimilation of the Indians.
Ornedal laid the failure of the padres to learn the native
tongues to their frequent shifting from one mission to another. Varo, dodging the issue, said that thirty years of
experience in mission administration had convinced him of
the wisdom of these periodical redistributions He insisted
that the custodian was under no obligation to submit his
plans for distribution of the missionaries to the governor,
who illegally was attempting to expand his powers of patronage. The change of atmosphere had a freshening effect
on both the padres and the Indians. In fact, the Indians of
9.

See earlier, Chart in Chapter II.
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one mission petitioned a former custodian for a new padre,
not because their present one was lax or oppressive, but
merely "because the padre has been with us for a long time."
I think that we will all agree that Padre Varo's psychology
was sound. 10
Against the serious charges of enforced personal service, extortion of Indian property and general oppression the
padres piled up convincing proof of their innocence. Ornedal
employed glittering generalities, blanket denunciations,
almost entirely unsupported by specific instances of such
oppression. From the earliest missionary times it was the
custom for the Indians to cultivate a field called "the
father's." This the Indians did voluntarily and gladly, for
they were burdened with no obventions as were the Spaniards. The padre's milpa yielded only enough to meet his
indispensable requirements, not a swollen harvest. As proof
that the Indians plan·ted the padre's milpa willingly the case
was cited of one group of mission Indians who refused to
accede to the request of their over-scrupulous minister that
they cease to trouble themselves with his plot, but instead
supply him at their pleasure from their own harvests. The
Indians wanted to continue the cultivation of the padre's
plot, for he often supplied them with corn when they were in
need.
.Padres Vermejo and Lezaun, after their unfortunate
experience with the Navajo-Apaches at Cebolleta and Encinal in the spring of 1750, were stationed at the missions
of Zia and Santa Ana respectively. They have left us some
interesting information on this matter of the padre's milpa.
Quite l,ogically, this sowing could not be excessive, for the
object was to keep the Indians docile, and to do so they had
to be brought to love their minister. In 1750 at Zia the fields
planted for Fray Vermejo yielded sixteen fanegas of corn (a
fanega equals 1.56 bushels) and less than two fanegas together of chile and beans. This harvest was an unusually
10. Varo Report, 1751, B. N., Leg. 9, Doc. 17, Folio 5v-6v; 13v-14v; Ximeno Report, 1750, Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 445.
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abundant one as the alcaldes and Indians could testify. The
alcalde of Jemez could testify that the Indians of that pueblo
never sowed more than two fanegas of wheat for their padre,
which that year yielded thirteen fanegas. At Santa Ana the
Indians in 1750 sowed for Padre Lezaun one-half a fanega
of wheat and a cupful (como una jicara) of corn, the barnbursting harvest from such an abundant sowing being easily
visualized. In the other missions the most that was sown
for the padres was three or four fanegas as the alcaldes could
testify. Sometimes the padres did not get a single grain of
wheat due to frequent plagues. In 1749 Vermejo had to
support himself on gu,aiabes,l°a not having any wheat. There
was no use in gathering a harvest greater than the padre's
own needs, for there was no market, and the surplus would
only spoil. Only a few of the Indians of each pueblo worked
in the padre's field, and while so occupied they were fed at
his expense.
The missionaries did not extort extra supplies of corn
from the homes of the Indians or steal livestock from their
corrals, for the Indians would not stomach this injustice, and
would lose respect for them and the religion that they taught.
At Acoma and Zuni the Indians willingly supplied their
padres with fresh meat daily because they had large flocks of
sheep and goats.
Equally false was the charge that the padres forced the
Indians to spin and weave large quantities of wool into
manta.-s. Where did the padres get all this wool to keep the
poor Indians busy? They had no flocks themselves. In the
Rio A rriba district, that is, north of Santa Fe in which nine
missions were located, neither the Spaniards nor the Indians
raised sheep in sufficient numbers to yield a sizeable wool
crop. The truth was, according to Padre Vermejo, that a
sheep was killed every fifteen days for the padre's support.
lOa. Guaiabe is a Pueblo Indian term for tbeir wafer-like corn bread. Well ground
Corn (not wheat) is prepared in a thin batter; then on a flat stone, well heated over
the fire, the Indian woman quickly spreads a handful to cook, and deftly folds the
sheet as it is finished. It tastes like H corn flakes," and Vermeio might easily have
fared worse; but protracted use of unleavened corn might weary one who was
accustomed to leavened wheat loaves.
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The wool was pulled from the pelt by two semaneros. who
kept half for themselves, the balance being woven into
clothes for the padre. In the nine missions of Rio Abajo,
where wool and cotton were more plentiful the Indians did
weave a few mantas to meet the padre's needs, but in no such
stupendous and excessive quantities as Ornedal reported. l l
The padres showed themselves very thankful for the
sinodos which the Crown sent annually. Ornedal claimed
that the padres engaged publicly in trade because their salaries arrived greatly curtailed.. This was untrue, and Ornedal, in order to support such a statement, would have to
have had access to the Franciscan records which in fact were
not available to him. The medium of exchange being mantas,
buffalo robes and buckskins (gamuzas) , the padres did obtain enough of the latter from the nomads to meet their
necessities not taken care of by royal aid and the yield of the
padres' fields.] 2
Ornedal, not content with heaping lies upon the good
name of the Order, gave the missionaries no credit for the
good work that they were doing. He made no mention of the
missionary activitieB among the heathen, of their willing
service as army chaplains, whenever called, on the campaigns
against the nomads or of the physical labor that they themselves did in constructing arid repairing convents and
churches with no aid from the civil government. Fray Vermejo in the fall of 1750 was working personally with his
Indians in building a new church and repairing the convent
that had fallen into disrepair. At Santa Ana, Fray Lezaun,
when he took over the mission, found the church half crumbled. In the short time of two months, under his direction,
the. Indians extracted vigas from the mountains, made
adobes and restored the church perfectlyYJ
11. Ximeno Report, 1750. Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 446-447; VermejoLezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 82, Folio 3v-4v; Varo Report, 1751, B. N., Leg.
9, Doc. 17, Folio 15v; Trigo Report, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 69, Folio 7.
12. Ximeno Report, 1750, Hackett, Hist<>rical Documents, III, 449; Varo Report,
1751. B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 17, Folio 12v-13; 15v.
13. Vermejo.Lezaun Report, 1750. B. N., Leg. 8. Doc. 82, Folio 5v.

160

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

In order to lend their assertions more validity in the
eyes of the viceroy, the padres obtained about a dozen testimonials, all given during the summer and fall of 1750, by
prominent laymen in the kingdom. It is interesting to note
that every testimonial was given by an ordinary vecino or an
ex-official, a former alcalde mayor, an alferez, a captain or
lieutenant of the presidio. The absence of testimonials of
officials then in office is explained by a decree issued by Governor Cachupin in 1750, which was intended to gag the
padres. This decree forbad the alcaldes mayores under any
condition to issue certificates to the padres under penalty of
a two hundred peso fine, deprivation of office and other drastic punishments. In this way the padres were unable to refute the charges made by Ornedal and the governor with testimonials of good conduct from the alcaldes. This decree was
confirmed by all of Cachupin's successors, through the term
of Governor Mendoza in 1760. So effective was this censureship that Franciscan provincials in Mexico got very little
news from the northern part of the Custodia. Varo's famous
report of 1751 would not have reached the provincial had it
not been smuggled out by a religious. The Franciscans were
forced to send their official mail among the papers of the
Holy Office with which the governors dared not tamper.
This decree accounted for a decade of Franciscan silence in
the Church-State quarrel, between the time that the Provincial Ximeno in March, 1750 sent the viceroy the first refutation of the Ornedal charges and the final recapitulation sent
to the viceroy in 1761 by Provincial Serrano. 14
For this reason the padres in 1750 were forced to obbin
testimonials from men who would not incur the penalties
connected with such a service. The testimony of the colonist
Geronimo Jaramillo, "a native of this Kingdom of New Mexico and one of its conquerors," is typical of that given by all.
This old follower of Vargas was proud of his title of conquistador, which lent his testimony added prestige. Many
14. Vermeio-Lezaun Report. October 29, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 82, Folio 5;
Serrano Report, 1761, Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 496-497.
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of these rude, old Spaniards found the pen unwieldy and
their grammar and spelling very rusty as they laboriously
scratched down the testimonials. One of them, Diego Torres,
was forced to dictate his testimony, affixing his signature
with great difficulty. Jaramillo, for fifty-six years a resident
of New Mexico, vouched for the good conduct of the padres;
the careful performan2e of their religious duties; that the
Indians sowed only enough for their essential needs; that the
Indian weavers supplied them with only a bare minimum of
sheets and mantas; that they exacted no obventions from
their charges; extorted no property, and did not engage improperly in trade. 15
The padres vigorously opposed Ornedal's plan to replace
them in Santa Fe and EI Paso with secular priests. Provincial Ximeno claimed that Ornedal was not in a position to·
obtain detailed information concerning the church revenue
produced in these towns. He could only have determined that
sum by an examination of the books kept by the missionaries
at each place, a privilege that he did not enjoy. HIs statements that the obventions of Santa Fe produced two thousand pesos annually and those of EI Paso two thousand five
hundred were gross exaggerations. In 1748 the total obventions at EI Paso came only to one thousand two hundred
pesos and neither villa was in a position to be converted into
a curacy.16
This attempt to introduce secular clergy was only one
more phase of a long, complicated and bitter struggle that
had been dragging on within the Church, namely the attempt
of the nearest episcopal authority, the Bishop of Durango,
to extend his jurisdiction over New Mexico. The quarrel
started in 1725 when Bishop Crespo visited the Custodia,
penetrating only as far north as EI Paso, where he exercised
his functions without much opposition. However, in 1730,
on his next visit he came all the way to Santa Fe. In several
of the missions the friars refused him permission to adminis15. B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 76, Folio 2-13, passim.
16. Ximeno Report, 1750, Hackett, Historical Documents, 111, 450-451; Varo Report, 1751, B. N., Leg. 9, Doc. 17, Folio 20v.
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ter the sacrament of Confirmation, acting upon instructions
from the custodian, Fray Andres Varo, who in turn was
obeying superior orders. Bishop Crespo began legal proceedings against the padres. The trial dragged on interminably
with appeals and counter-appeals, the advantage swinging
from one side to the other. Bishop Elizacochea continued to
prosecute the case of his predecessor, and brought it before
the Council of the Indies. He visited New Mexico in 1737
without any recorded opposition, leaving a record of his passage on Inscription Rock (EI Morro) near Zuni. The law
suit bt;lgun years before by Crespo, was still simmering in
1750. The padres evidently suspected, with good reason, that
Ornedal was an agent of the bishop, and were determined
not to subordinate their Custodia to the Durangan mitre,
which in their eyes would be to its prejudice. Santa Fe was
removed over four hundred arduous leagues from Durango,
a distance too great to enable the bishop, without the elaborate organization of the Franciscans, to exercise effective
control, and the missions were too poor to support parish
priests, who would have no royal sinodos. Moreover, the
Franciscans dreaded the thought of being subordinated to a
strange authority after two centuries of autonomy, a subordination which might ultimately result in their complete
removal.
The bishop, regardless of the undecided state of the
lawsuit, by 1750 had succeeded in placing jueces ecclesiasticos at ;Santa Fe and EI Paso, and was collecting tithes,17
qrnedal's "economy streak" in the New Mexico missions involved cutting down the number of missionaries, and
therefore the number of sinodos, by having one padre administer several missions instead of only one. To a person with
an eye to slashing expenditures, having casually glanced at
a map of the missions, Ornedal's plan would seem quite
sensible and long overdue, for the neat little churches, desig:
nating missions, look but a stone's throw apart. However,
17. Bancroft, History of New Mexico, 240-242; Twitchell, Leading Facts. I. 437;
Varo Report, 1749. B. N .• Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 5v-6; Ximeno Report, 1750. Hackett,
Histc;rical Documents, III, 450.
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such a person would be guilty of over-simplified and perfunctory thinking. Such, in fact, was the opinion of the padres of
Ornedal's scheme. He traveled along the camino real in
comparative ease in a carriage or on horseback, visiting only
a few of the pueblos and getting no conception of the difficulties of travel off the beaten track. He had only a rough idea
of the locality and accessibility of many of the missions. He
did not consider that the missionary might be called upon at
any hour, night or day, in all sorts of weather, to make sick
calls or say Mass. "They are exposed to great danger and
peril at all times, having to cross rivers in canoes often at
night and at times when their waters are in flood and very
rapid." Certainly anyone who has traveled considerably in
present day New Mexico will agree with Padre Ximeno in
his estimate of the difficulties of travel. Even today ·one need
only desert the main highways to experience the many obstacles that beset the traveller; the stickiest, most slippery mud
in existence; red, death-dealing torrents of water suddenly
rounding the bend of a dry arroyo, caused by a cloudburst
miles away; earth shaking electrical storms and deep snows
in the winter. All these the padre experienced, on foot or
horseback.
The missionary could not possibly attend to all his
multifarious duties under the conditions suggested by Ornedal. He could not answer all the simultaneous calls in different missions for his services; he might reach a dying Indian
too late to aid him. "The Catholic Kings, in their Christian
and pious zeal, do not desire to save the royal funds at such
expense to the spiritual welfare ..." of their subjects.
Besides the damage to the spiritual welfare of the Indians that this excessive retrenchment would have caused,
the provincial reminded the viceroy that the missionaries, as
human beings, needed some earthly consolations. He cited a
passage from the mediaeval Spanish law code, Las Siete Partidas, that no friar should be sent off alone, for he needed the
company of others "to comfort him, and give him strength to
struggle with the devil, the world and the flesh, which are the
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enemies of the Soul, for he who lives alone is miserable."
Alfonso the Wise knew his practical psychology, and the law
that he perpetuated was dusted off in an effort to alleviate
the loneliness of friars living in a remote valley, thousands
of miles from Spain, five hundred years after that monarch's
reign.
Ornedal ignored both the laws of the Church and the
Siete Partidas when he intended a solitary man to care for
two, three or even four missions. Yet he showed himself
inconsistently lenient when he suggested that the missions of
the El Paso region be erected into curacies, for he gave the
curate two ecclesiastics to bear him company. Ironically
the provincial asked, "Is this, perchance, because the sack
cloth worn by the religious is woven in a loom of less
account ?"18
We have seen how the padres defended their reputations
from the charges heaped upon them by the Cachupin-Ornedal clique and, with one exception, the ignorance of native
dialects, they acquitted themselves in a convincing manner.
But they did not confine themselves to the defensive, for the
Ornedal report and trouble with the governor had aroused
their anger, and they struck out on a vigorous offensive. The
Franciscan counterblast was bitter to the extreme, and innumerable charges of all varieties were heaped upon the secular
authorities. Again, in making evaluations, one must constantly keep in mind that we see the governor and his henchmen only in the lurid light of the Franciscan denunciations,
but even after making a liberal discount for clerical exaggerations, the hands of the secular authorities appear far
from clean.
Governor Cachupin, Ornedal and the alcaldes exercised
a cruel tyranny over the Franciscans, the Indians and the
vecinos, in fact the whole Kingdom groaned under continual
oppression. Listen to the wail that Padre Varo, like another
Jeremiah, sent out of the desert:
18.

Ximeno Report, 1750, Hackett. Historical Documents. III. 451-454.
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Oh land and Kingdom of New Mexico! So long
oppressed, humiliated, and persecuted, so often not
governed, but tyrannized over by these unworthy
chiefs, who, having been honored by our Catholic
and most zealous Kings with the governorship for
the purpose of establishing peace, administering
justice, upholding the law of God, protecting the
poor, especially the unhappy Indians and defending the community of Christians from the heathen
who surround it on all sides, do not do SO.19
Padre Carlos Delgado in his blistering report "concerning the abominable hostilities and tyrannies of the governors and alcaldes mayores toward the Indians to the
consternation of the Custodia," indulged in an even more
sweeping denunciation:
I declare, that of the eleven governors and the many
alcaldes mayores whom I have known in the long
period of forty years that I have served at the mission called San Agustin de la Isleta, most of them
have hated, and do hate to the death, and insult and
persecute the missionary religious, causing them all
the troubles and annoyances that their passion dictates, without any other reason or fault than the
opposition of the religious to the very serious injustices which the said governors and alcaldes
inflict upon the helpless Indians recently received
into the faith, so that the said converts shall not
forsake our holy law and flee to the heathen, to
take up anew their former idolatries. 20
Most of the governors looked upon their office as a commercial enterprise, although forbidden by law to indulge
in trade while in office, using every minute of their term to
amass a private fortune. Many came burdened with debts,
obsessed with the one idea of putting themselves on their feet
financially and ignored completely the welfare of the province. The resources of the Kingdom were few and slim, and
exploitation of the Indians, through the alcaldes mayores,
19.
20.

Serrano Report. 1761, Hackett, Histe>rical Document., III. 483.
Delgado Report, 1750, Hackett, Historical Document., III, 426.
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was one of the few ways to acquire wealth even to the extent
of fifty or sixty thousand pesos in the five year term. 21
Perhaps the most flagrant form of exploitation to which
the Indians were subjected by the secular authorities was the
oppressive system of personal service. According to law the
Indian was to be treated as a free laborer and paid for his
work. These serruJ,neros served in shifts for the period of a
week at the end of which time they were replaced by another
shift. They were mainly household servants performing
various tasks about the residences of the governor and the
alcaldes. The Indians serving the governors were drawn
from the missions up stream (Rio Arriba) during the
warmer months, that is from Easter to All Saints' Day and
from down stream (Rio Abajo) during the colder months,
from All Souls' Day to Easter, for many of the northern
pueblos were snow bound during the winter. The new shift
arrived every Sunday at the Royal Palace in Santa Fe, consisting of five men and five women. The men cut and hauled
firewood, and performed other menial tasks. The principal
employment of the women was the grinding of corn on their
stone metates. No Indian escaped this service, not even the
young neophytes that were being instructed by the padres.
The semaneros had to come as best they could, on foot or
horseback, often many leagues, in all conditions of weather,
the suffering being especially intense in winter when a heavy
blanket of snow covered the Santa Fe region.
Misfortunes and scandals frequently resulted in connection with the Indian servants. The married women, who
left their pueblos pregnant, often had miscarriages as a
result of the hard labor and the hardships of the long journey to and from Santa Fe. 22 Even more common was the
disrespect that some of the governors and alcaldes had for
the sacredness of the Indian family. They openly violated
the wives and daughters with the result that many husbands
repudiated their wives. Padre Delgado gives a graphic
description of the callousness of the officials in this respect.
21.
22.

Serrano Report, 1761, Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 486.
Lezaun Report, 1760, Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 470-471.
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The shameless way in which the officials conduct
themselves in this particular is proved by an occasion when a certain Governor was in conversation
with some missionaries, and an Indian woman
came into their presence to charge him with the
rape of her daughter, and he, without changing
countenance ordered that she be paid by merely
giving her a buffalo skin that he had on hand. 2a
In addition the missions had to furnish every week
Indians to herd the governor's sheep and cattle. They not
only built corrals and sheared the sheep but furnished the
poles, axes and shears. A great evil was the custom of forcing the Indians to drive the governor's cattle to Chihuahua
City, over two hundred leagues from Santa Fe. Such a trip
gave the Indian little chance to till his fields and care for his
family.
The governors were hand in glove with the alcaldes,
and, upon selling them their wands (varas) of office, advised
them to join in squeezing the Indians dry. The alcaldes were
given a free hand as long as they obeyed the governor and
kept him friendly by liberal gifts. Following the example of
the governors, they exploited the Indians living in their
alcaldia. It cost them nothing to raise, harvest and grind a
crop of corn or wheat, using squads of conscripted Indians.
The Indians also performed other tasks; clearing acequias,
making adC!bes, weeding fields and shearing sheep. The
alcaldes rarely appeared in the pueblos, unless it was to
squeeze the Indians in some way, for themselves or the governors. "Everywhere there is nothing but 'let Indians come,'
'let Indians go,' 'let Indians carry that' ... "24
Besides this personal, semanero type of service the Indians were exploited in other ways. The governors through
the alcaldes collected all the wool they could from the Indians,
alloting a certain amount to each pueblo to be washed,
combed, carded, spun and woven into blankets and delivered
23. Delgado Report. 1750, Hackett, Historical Doc"mentH, III. 427-428.
24. Serrano Report, 1761, Hackett, Histo'r'ieal Documents. III, 485;
Report, 1750, Hackett. Historical Documents, III. 427.
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by a certain date. One can imagine the labor of transporting
these blankets to Santa Fe, sometimes from missions as far
distant as Zuni, seventy leagues away. In 1750 the alcalde of
Isleta forced the Indians of that pueblo to shear "over one
thousand" head of his sheep (mill y tantas). The wool was
distributed, a blanket required from each home. 25 In the
same year the alcalde collected from the pueblo nearly two
hundred blankets that the Indians had been forced to weave
for the governor. 26
"For none of these immense labors do these unfortunates
receive any other reward, wage, or recompense than this;
that it is for the senor governor, it belongs to the senor governor, the senor governor orders it."27
Not content with burdening the Indians with the hated
tejidos, the governors had the alcaldes "buy" or extort from
the pueblos large quantities of maize, which the Indians had
to carry gratis to the governor's residence. Payment was
usually long overdue, if forthcoming at all, and then, only at
greatly reduced rates. Payment was made in kind there
being no money, usually in the form of baubles called chuchumates,-glass beads, cheap knives and awls or a few fistfuls
of low grade tobacco. 28
Frequently the officials made no pretense of paying,
frankly extorting the maize. In July 1749 Fray Juan de
Lezaun at San Felipe saw the alcalde and the lieutenant of
the presidio remove one hundred and sixty-five fanegas of
corn by order of the governor. The Indians ca~ried it to
Santa Fe, but received no payment. At Acoma the Indians
were forced by the alcalde, Antonio de Ruyamor, acting
again under Governor Cachupfn's order, to give up one hundred and thirty-three fanegas of corn, which they grudgingly
stored in the convent. In October, 1749, when Governor
Cachupin visited Acoma, he discovered that the corn had
been spoiled (estaba comido de jorgojo) and ordered the
25.
26.
27.
28.

Trigo Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 69, Folio 6.
Vermejo-Lezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 82, Folio 12.
Serrano Report, 1761, Hackett, Historical Documents, Ill, 485.
Delgado Report, Hackett, Hi..torical Documents, Ill, 426.
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Indians to furnish a new supply. This so enraged the
Acomas that they armed themselves. Governor Cachupin,
after his notorious visit to the new missions of Encinal and
Cebolleta, returned to Acoma, where, in the padres' presence,
his men forced the Indians to turn over sheep from their
corrals, being paid one real for the animals, whose worth
was two belduques. Those Indians who were unwilling to
sell their sheep at such a price were forced to do so. The
same thing happened at Laguna. Padre Vermejo attributed
the refusal of the Navajo-Apaches at the near-by missions
of Cebolleta and Encinal to continue in their intention of
becoming Christians to what they saw were the concomitants
of Christianity.
The governors, after they had amassed a large supply of
corn, blankets, and livestock shipped them to Mexico for
sale. In 1750 Governor Cachupin allowed Lieutenant General Bernardo Bustamante to send a shipment of corn, extorted from the needy Indians, to Chihuahua at a time when
two years of crop failures had reduced the inhabitants to
such straits that they were forced to subsist on toasted strips
of sheep skin (chicharros) and insects. 29
The padres were powerless to stop the injustices of the
governor and his minions. When they raised their voices in
protest he and the· alcaldes persecuted and insulted them,
heaping upon them false charges certified by suborned witnesses. The governor was able to force the custodian to
transfer a crusading padre (an illegal use of Royal patronage) to a quiet out of the way mission, by refusing to
certify the yearly sinodo estimates. If the viceroy received
no certification from the governor the salaries were not sent.
In addition to this, recall Governor Cachupin's decree forbidding the alcaldes to grant the padres any certificates, thus
effectively preventing them from denouncing him or defending themselves outside the Kingdom. 30
The "insults, injuries, oppressions and dishonors" that
the governors heaped upon the padres until they were so
29.
SO.

Vermejo-Lezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg, 8, Doc. 82, Folio 8-9.
Delgado Report, 1750, Hackett, Histori<:al Documents, III, 429-430.
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cowed that they could not defend the Indians, do not seem so
terrible to the layman, in fact they appear to boil down to a
few threats, bad names and protruded tongues. Padre Varo
in a sanctimonious vein wrote, "there have been governors
who have very nearly gone so far as to strike the padres."31
The worst that Governor Cachupin seems to have done was
to heap insults on certain padres, brandishing at the same
time a cudgel over their heads. He also threatened to banish Padres Ignacio Pino and Andres Garcia to Mexico, tied
over the backs of mules. 32 In spite of the fact that the padres
had no physical means of protecting the Indians from injustice they seem to have ceased their protests and lost courage
too readily.
The padres were quite justified in their complaints that
the cruelties, extortions, and forced labors imposed by the
secular officials upon the Indians had a disastrous effect on
the mission program. An Indian could not be expected to
become attached to a religion and a way of life that for him
brought nothing but misery and unrecompensed hard work.
Consequently, we run across the frequent complaints that
many Indians in desperation apostacized, and joined the
heathen, confirming them in their idolatry. When Padre
Delgado went among the heathen apostates, they in bitter
reply to his exhortations, showed him huge scars received at
the hands of the alcaldes. Why should they go back to such
a life?33
It is a black picture that the padres give us of the governors and the alcaldes, one that must be considerably overdrawn, yet enough candor and honest evidence remain to
justify the conclusion that the Indians bore the brunt of
many injustices, and that the padres were their best and
most conscientious friends. Because both parties in this bitter struggle took such uncompromising stands, not admitting
a single virtue in the opposing camp, and because the vast
majority of the available evidence is on the side of the
31.
32.

33.
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padres, it is only just and significant to cite two of the few
available records that show the secular authorities in a more
favorable light.
In September, 1742 an Indian from Nambe brought
charges against two Spaniards who had invaded his melon
patch, given him a beating and made off with six melons.
The Spaniards were fined twenty and fifteen pesos respectively.34
In 1753, while Cachupin was still governor, the Indians
of San Felipe mission had arranged to buy a tract of land
from a Spanish family at Angostura for nine hundred pesos.
The alcalde of that district advised the governor that the
Indians should be protected against fraud by the appointment of two honest, capable persons to appraise the land in
question. Cachupin appointed the appraisers and the result
of their investigation proved that the land had been overvalued by three hundred pesos. The governor therefore ordered the sale at six hundred pesos which was done, the
Indians paying for the land in cattle, sheep, and buckskins.
This incident certainly indicates that Governor Cachupin
was fully aware of the customary methods used at the time
to defraud the Indians, and was determined to prevent
unfair procedure. 35
These are not unique cases, and indicate that sometimes
the governors and alcaldes did have the interest of the Indians at ·heart.
CHAPTER

VI

THE PREDATORY NOMAD

Interwoven with the many-sided Church-State conflict
and of vital concern to the welfare of the missions was the
relation of the secular authority with the heathen nomads.
This relation was of a dual nature; positive and negative,
with the emphasis on the negative side. The chief task of the
governor in his capacity as captain general of the Kingdom
34.
35.
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of New Mexico was to protect the missions, and thereby hold
Spain's frontier from the attacks of the wild Indian. We
have seen that at Santa Fe was stationed one of the two presidios in the Kingdom, the nearest other being four hundred
miles south at EI Paso. This garrison consisted of eighty
soldiers, certainly a ridiculously small number to protect so
vast an area against a very formidable and numerous foe.
With the exception of the Moquis, the Pueblo Indians
after the completion of the reconquest in 1696 ceased to be
a military problem. Experience had taught them the futility
of fighting the Spaniards. The enemy lay without. The
eighteenth century, as no previous period in the history of
New Mexico, was one of almost constant warfare between
the Spaniards and the nomad enemies-the Apaches, the
Navajos, the Utes (Yutas) and in particular the Comanches. In the middle of the eighteenth century there
seems to have been very little trouble from the Navajos and
Apaches, the enemy par excellence being the Comanches and
to a lesser extent the Utes, who often joined the Comanches
in their plundering.
That the presidial soldiers succeeded in holding their
own against the nomads is indeed an amazing feat. It is true
that they were re-enforced by the Spanish vecinos and
Indian levies from the missions, but this handful of men was
the core of the military power of the Kingdom. The argument
might be raised that Cortes and Pizarro conquered powerful,
aboriginal empires, peopled with thousands of warriors, with
not many more men than the governor had at his disposal
at Santa Fe. This is very true, but it must be remembered
that these two conquistadores, not to detract one bit from
their amazing achievements, owed their success in large part
to superior weapons, to that terrible beast, the horse, and to
the enemy's superstitious fears upon which they were able
to capitalize. On the other hand, the presidial soldier in
Santa Fe had neither a material nor psychological advantage
over his clever enemy. Mr. A. F. Bandelier sums up the situation very thoroughly:
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The savage Indians grasped the utility of the horse
and of firearms with much greater vigor than
sedentary tribes, and the complaint is often heard
that the Apaches as well as the Comanches were
better armed and better equipped than the few
Spanish soldiers, who pretended to defend New
Mexico against their incursions !l
The Comanches were master fighters. Using guerrilla
tactics, extremely mobile on their swift, hardy ponies, armed
with up-to-date firearms, they struck suddenly and disappeared before. the' soldiers at Santa Fe could saddle their
horses. Unlike the Incas and the Aztecs they indulged in no
suicidal frontal attacks in mass formation, but fought by
surprise attacks, ambuscades, cutting down small detachments, and raiding isolated Spanish settlements and outlying
missions. As an indication of the desperate straits to which
the Spaniards were reduced by the Indian menace, in 1770
the Feast of Our Lady of Victory was established in which
public prayers were offered, and a religious procession
wound through the streets in an appeal for aid against the
enemy.2
In view of the overwhelming odds facing the military
power its achievements were quite laudable. The Indian
menace was by no means ended in this period nor for that
matter until long after the United States had taken over the
Southwest,S but the governors were constantly despatching
or leading expeditions to punish the nomads. That the fighting was marked with the traditional Spanish ferocity was
1. Adolf F. Bandelier, Investigations in the South WeBt, part I, 212, appearing as
a footnote in Twitchell, I.eading Facts, I, 440.
2. "Information communicated by Juan Candelaria of this Villa de San Francisco Xavier de Albuquerque, Born 1692-Age 84," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
July, 1929, 296-297.
3. Several years ago, while I was working at a cattle rancb in San Miguel County,
in north central New Mexico, I heard a vivid echo of those once terrible Comanche
raiders. I was riding with a fine, gray haired Spanish American, whose family had
lived in that locality for centuries. As we approached a group of weathered, sandstone boulders, standing grotesquely in the rolling prairie. he reined in his horse and
pointed to them saying that there his grandfather and thirty other Mexican sheep.
herders had been surprised and slaughtered by marauding Comanches from Oklahoma
Indian territory. This incident occurred a century later than the period that we are
considering, and New Mexico was flying the flag of a powerful Republic I
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certainly true, for, on March 21; 1741, Governor Mendoza
issued a decree prohibiting the pillaging of the settlements of
savage Indians when they were occupied by defenseless
women and children during the campaign. That this decree
was disregarded is indicated by the issuance of a similar
decree on May 30, 1744 by Governor Codallos, prohibiting
cruelty to defenseless women and children of the hostiles. 4
In June, 1746 the Comanches raided the Pueblo of
Pecos, killing twelve inhabitants, and also committing depredations at Galisteo and elsewhere. The popular clamor for
military action caused Governor CodalIos to ask for increased powers. After the inevitable reports and investigations the viceroy granted the necessary authority. In October, 1747 Codallos, with over five hundred men, including
presidial soldiers, Spanish colonists, levies of mission Indians and Indian allies, came upon the Comanches and some
of their Ute allies north of Abiquiu, and won a decisive victory. The governor reported the capture of two hundred and
six enemies, one hundred and seven more having been killed.
Four of the captives were shot and nearly a thousand horses
captured. In January, 1748 Codallos, with a smaller force
repulsed the Comanches at Pecos, although his Indian allies
suffered some fatalities. 5
Governor Codallos' successor, Tomas Cachupin, was
also an active campaigner. In 1751 he marched against the
Comanches, who had raided Galisteo mission. With one hundred and sixty-four men behind him he caught up with the
Comanches and drove one hundred and forty-five of them
into a tular to which he set fire. One hundred and one Comanches perished in the smoke and flames, and the balance
were taken prisoners. Keeping four 'hostages, Cachupin
released forty of the captives to join their women and children. This spectacular victory was gained with only one
fatality to the Spanish force. Cachupin's success brought him
4.
5.
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the congratulations of the viceroy, who reported the victory
to the King. 6
These victories as reported by the governors seem quite
impressive, and the viceroy must have felt that his subordinates were sparing themselves no effort or danger to defend that distant Spanish outpost from the attacks of the
nomad Indians. However, the viceregal confidence in the
truth of the gubernatorial reports must have been severely
shaken by the very upsetting and contradictory reports that
reached him from the missionaries in New Mexico.
In the eyes of the padres a consistent, wise, just and
vigorous policy towards the nomad gentiles was necessary on
the part of the secular authority of the Kingdom to ensure
the welfare of the missions and the Spanish settlements.
Franciscan reports from New Mexico not only charged the
governors with gross neglect of their military duties, the
reporting of expeditions and victories that had no basis
in fact but with injustice and cruelty in their treatment of
the soldiers, and, even worse, of directly furnishing the
enemy with arms and supplies.
In order to understand the nature of this charge of
gubernatorial connivance with the enemy it is necessary,
briefly, to consider the economic life of the Kingdom. Agriculture and stock raising were the principal sources of livelihood for the Spanish colonists. The vecinos, for the most
part were small farmers, raising their crops and fruits in
narrow fields in the bottoms of rock-bound canyons, where
irrigation was possible. They had considerable numbers of
horses, mules, cattle, sheep, goats and other livestock. Mining and the manufacturing industries were of minor importance. Money was practically non-existent, and barter economy reigned supreme in this isolated, self-sufficient Spanish outcropping.
Commercial relations with the rest of New Spain
amounted to but a trickle. In Padre Varo's report of 1749
he placed the total annual trade between the EI Paso region
6.

Bancroft, HistoT1J of New Mexico. 256.
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and up-river New Mexico at only two thousand six hundred
pesos. Pinons, skins, cotton and woolen mantas, livestock
and some food stuffs were sent south to EI Paso and the
mines of Chihuahua and there bartered for the crops, wine,
and aguardiente. 7
Although the extent of the trade between Spaniards of
northern New Mexico and those of southern New Mexico
and Nueva Viscaya was sluggish and insignificant, there was
a buzz of activity in the north with the nomad Gentiles.
These nomads, especially the Comanches, would come frequently from the Great Plains to the missions and Spanish
settlements to trade, bringing prisoners of war, many of
them boys and girls, buckskins and buffalo skins and meat.
These they traded for things that they were eager to gethorses, knives, tools and firearms-all of which they effectively turned against the Spaniards on the next raid.
According to the padres, the governors and the alcaldes
mayores not only encouraged this commerce but succeeded
in monopolizing it to the great detriment of the Kingdom.
Although bands of nomads came frequently to trade at the
various Spanish settlements and missions, the most important event was the annual Taos fair. Every summer the
nomads, particularly the Comanche nation, gathered at this
northern mission in the vicinity of which was a considerable
Spanish population.
These fairs must have been exciting, eagerly-awaited
events in the monotonous, sluggish, life of that remote province. The news of the advent of the Comanches was noised
up and down the river valley causing a flutter comparable to
that of the arrival of the annual fleet at Vera Cruz. The
governor and his minions gathered together all manner of
goods to barter; horses, axes, hoes, awls, wedges, picks,
bridles, machetes, knives of all kinds, powder and firearms.
Although the vecinos and other mission Indians also attended, the governor and his "machine" controlled most of
the goods to be bartered. The nomad encampment-hun7.

B. N., Leg. 8, Doe. 57, Folio 4.
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dreds of tepees blooming on the gray Taos plain at the foot of
the turquoise-blue Sangre de Cristo mountains, may very
well have reminded the Franciscan chronicler of the sails of
the fiota as it approached Vera Cruz.
The fair in full swing was a vivid, strange, barbaric
sight-the heat of the sun; the dust of countless hooves,
boots and moccasins; the reek of men, animals and skins;
the confusion of tongues; the tenseness of the atmosphere,
Spaniards and Indians suspiciously bent on driving a hard
bargain, yet with one eye on their weapons; and the thin blue
wisps of smoke rising from the countless cooking fires. The
nomads offered buffalo meat, skins and (most va"Iuable to
the Spaniards) slaves of both sexes and all ages. The Spaniards by their greed and quarrelsomeness often brought the
nomads to the verge of bloodshed. On one occasion hostilities were already starting when a padre intervened and managed to restore peace. The saddest and most revolting part
of this spectacle was the treatment of the female slaves.
Openly, in the sight of all, before delivering them to the
Spaniards the warriors proceeded to rape all those of any
size, delivering the poor wretches to their new masters with
an insolent grin saying, "Now you can take her-now she is
good."8
The padres naturally opposed this commerce with the
enemy nomads. The governor and his officials by encouraging this trade, were supplying the enemy with the means of
destruction. It is true that the nomads obtained some firearms from French traders in the east, and that the French
occasionally appeared in New Mexico. In 1739 a small party
of French traders visited Santa Fe, and in 1747 another
party of thirty-three Frenchmen sold firearms to the Comanches on the Rio de Jicarilla north of Santa Fe.!) However, the padres were quite right in saying that the gov8. Based on the account of Padre Andres Varo, 1751, included in the Serrano
Report, 1761, Hackett, Histoncal Documents, III, 486-487.
9. Twitchell, Leading Facts, I, 488 and 440. For further information on French
activities in New Mexico in this period see H. E. Bolton, Fr.....h ]ntTUBiona into New
Mezico, 17.9-115:; (New York, 1917).
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ernors were turning a suicidal knife on the missions and
Spanish settlements by their commercial policy with the
nomads. In 1748 a junta, dominated by the governor and his
officials was called to determine whether or not the Comanches should be permitted to continue to attend the Taos
fairs. A decision was reached favoring the continuance of
the practice in spite of the opposition of the custodian. lO This
trade with the enemy of the faith was clearly illegal, being
contrary to Apostalic Bulls and royal decrees.
The governor by his monopoly of the trade kept prices
abnormally high. Merchants and dealers from Mexico had
no incentive to come to New Mexico, where they would have
encouraged immigration, brought in capital and developed
the province. As it was, the commercial privileges were
divided between a small official clique and the nomad enemies, and the province remained poor and underdeveloped,u
As Padre Varo expressed it, "These textiles [mantas woven
by the mission Indians], antelope and buffalo skins are the
principal object and attraction of the governors. They are
the rich mines of this Kingdom."12
The padres denied the charge of the governor that they
engaged in trade. The only trade in the Kingdom being that
with the gentiles, it was ridiculous to accuse them of commerce, forbidden by Papal Bulls and condemned by their
own preaching, commerce which would boomerang on the
very missions for whose welfare they were devoting their
lives,13
The governors with their eagerness for Indian slaves
and buffalo skins followed no consistent, vigorous policy of
punishing the nomads for their raids. The clever Comanches
grew increasingly audacious enjoying immunity when desirous of trading, and being free to turn around and raid a place
where a few weeks before they had peacefully bartered.
10. Bancroft, Hi"tory of New Mexico, 249-250,
11. Vermejo-Lezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 28, Folio 10.
12. Varo Report, 1751, B. N., Leg. 9, Doc. 17, Folio 16v. "Estos texidos, gamuzas
y sibolos es eJ principal objeto y atractivo de los Gobernadores. Son las minas ricas
de este Reyno."
Vermejo-Lezaun Report,
B. N., Leg.
Doc.
Folio

13.

1750,

8,

82,

3.
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The Franciscans not only charged the governors with
willfully neglecting their military duties and abetting the
enemy, but labelled them as incapable, cruel and corrupt
commanders. The governors were drawn from the commercial and courtly class having had little military training.
Lacking experience in the art of Indian warfare they usually
ignored the advice of their captains, sergeants and alferezes,
men who had been taught how to fight the nomads by bitter
experience. The commissions (plazas) of capable men were
withdrawn if they opposed the governor and ranks were
filled with green and pliable boys. Campaigns were expensive, tedious and destructive, and the governors preferred
to spend the time amassing a fortune. If they did go on ca:r:npaigns they were only shorHived, half-hearted affairs, from
which they returned with wildly exaggerated tales of
success. If anything was accomplished against the barbarians it was by the private efforts of the poor but valiant
Spanish vecinos. 14
The soldiers, settlers and Indians who were drafted for
military campaigns could not be expected to fight with
enthusiasm for cruel governors. The soldiers were greatly
overworked and underpaid. These eighty men, paid for the
service of his majesty, were used as eighty personal servants
in the interest of the governor and led a wretched existence.
The lieutenant of the presidio assured Padre Vermejo that
the soldiers received only abuut one hundred pesos of the
legal four hundred peso salary. This fraction they received
in goods, not what they needed or wanied but what the governor chose to give them. 15
Another interesting variation of gubernatorial injustice
and peculation was in the allocation of cavalry mounts
among the soldiers. Vermejo and other padres witnessed
such a distribution by Governor Cachupin. He forced upon
the soldiers the sorriest nags, for which they had to pay
him twelve pesos de. plata. This amount was pure profit, for
14.
15.

Serrano Report. 1761. Hackett. Historical Document•• III. 490-49l.
Vermejo-Lezaun Report. 1750. B. N., Leg. 8. Doc. 82. Folio 9v.
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the Crown supplied the horses.. As a result of being mounted
on culls, a brave sergeant and two soldiers, "the best lads in
the Kingdom," were killed by the Apaches. 16
Padres Vermejo and Lezaun cited other examples of
Governor Cachupin's evil nature. Early in 1750 Cachupin
was advised by trustworthy reports of the advent of a large
band of Comanches from the south and east. He was told
that they always came by way of Galisteo and Pecos on their
way to Taos, and would either trade or attack as the situation permitted. The governor ignored the warning and proceeded directly to Taos with his soldiers to meet the Indians.
As a result Galisteo mission, left unguarded was attacked
and ten mission Indians were killed. In October, 1750 the
Apaches came twice to trade. The governor knew very well
that the mules that they brought to exchange were stolen
from Spaniards around El Paso, yet he permitted them to
complete their business unmolested,17
The iniquity of Cachupin's predecessor, Joaquin Codallos 1743-1749, in the matter of mission defense and Indian
commerce reached breath-taking proportions, according to
the Franciscan reports. In August, 1747 the Comanches
raided the town of Abiquiu, on the Chama river northwest of
Santa Fe, killing a girl, an old woman and carrying off
twenty-three women and children. Custodian Mirabal at San
Juan reported the disaster immediately to Governor Codallos,
who ignored the report. Under the pressure of another letter
from Mirabal and aroused public opinion, Codallos finally
sent soldiers in pursuit. The Indians had a lead of four days,
and the soldiers were unable to catch up with them. In the
meantime the irate vecinos of Abiquiu organized a posse of
their own. Following the Comanche trail they found three
dead women and the body of a newly born child. Seven years
later one of these women was returned by the Comanches. ls
16.

Vermejo-Lezaun Report. 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 82, Folio 10. A peso de

plata had twice the value of a peso de tierra, which was the local unit of value.
17.
18.

Vermejo-Lezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 82, Folio 7v.
Lezaun Report, 1760, Hackett, Hist<>ricaJ. Documents, III. 477.
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An even more sensational charge against Governor
Codallos was made by the padres. Just before the end of his
term he appropriated all the powder in the presidio and sent
it to Chihuahua to be sold. His successor Cachupin and the
presidial inspector Ornedal were perfectly aware of this,
but did nothing to remedy the situation. The Kingdom of
New Mexico remained powderless for a year while predatory nomads robbed and killed on all sides!
Equally amazing and far more ironic was Codallos'
order to have the stone mortars (pedr'eros) that were at
Galisteo dismantled, knives and awls being fashioned out of
the metal parts to trade with the nomad enemies. The Comanches hitherto restrained on account of the awesome
cannons promptly attacked the unprotected pueblo, killing
a number of its inhabitants. 19
One last and dramatic episode of the numerous ones
available will suffice to illustrate the seriousness of the
Indian menace and the culpable failure of the governors to
protect the Kingdom. During the same administration of the
public spirited Governor Codallos the Indians of Pecos came
to Santa Fe and asked permission to go eastward on the
buffalo plains "into the land of the Comanches (a tierra de
los Comanches)" to hunt. Codallos knew full well the dangerous character of this enterprise, and was advised by
competent persons to refuse the permission. However,
yielding to his selfish interests, he granted the license with
strings attached. Before setting out on their hunt the Indians had to do some carpentry work on the governor's
house, and also guarantee to bring him a certain number of
buffalo tongues, evidently a great delicacy.
The preliminary stipulations having been settled, nearly
the entire pueblo of Pecos started out on this hunt. They
had gone only a short distance when disaster befell them.
They walked into a cleverly laid Comanche ambush, and over
one hundred and fifty of them were killed.
19.

Vermejo-Lezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doe. 82, Folio 10.
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Immediately on hearing the news of this disaster the
lieutenant of the presidio, Don Manuel, with fifty soldiers
hurried to punish the Comanches. They likewise fell into a
trap in which ten Spaniards were killed, the others fleeing in
disorder to the shelter of Pecos pueblo. The Comanches were
so formidable because they were supplied with up to date
weapons obtained as a result of the criminal greed of the
governor.
As a result of this major set back Governor Codallos
was forced to exert himself. A force of over seven hundred
men was raised to punish the insolent Comanches, a really
stupendous army considering the resources of the Kingdom.
Our old amigo Lieutenant General Bustamante took command of the field. The expedition was accompanied by Padre
Agustin de Yniesta, who served as royal chaplain, and it was
he who furnished our informant Padre Vermejo with the
facts. Several days out, about dawn, while the Spanish camp
was still wrapped in sleep, and Lieutenant General Bustamante "was in bed as if he were at his wife's side (estando en
cama como si estubie1-a a ellado de su muger) ," a group of
Comanches silently appeared and made off with one thousand
one hundred and thirty-one horses, leaving the Spanish army
very much a pie. A few soldiers and vecinos who were not
caught unawares pursued the enemy, spurred on by the command, under the penalty of death, of the irate and sleepy
Bustamante. The chase was futile and the dismounted army
ludicrously straggled back to Santa Fe where the soldiers
made the most of a bad situation by proudly announcing a
smashing victory and repairing to the church to give thanks
to God. Shortly afterwards, a group of trading Comanches
rode into Santa Fe with smirks on their faces. Mocking the
Spaniards, these foolhardy Indians announced that only
twenty squaws and ten warriors had accomplished that
amazing feat.Z° This story that Padre Vermejo told with
such sarcastic glee borders so nearly on the ludicrous that
it probably must be taken with large reservations, but it is
20.

Vermeio-Lezaun Report, 1750, B. N., Leg. 8, Doc. 82. Folio 12v-13.
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certainly indicative of the spirit with which the Indian campaigns were conducted.
Out of this welter of claims and counter claims, of assertions of victories and of denials made by the governors and
their Franciscan opponents, one can at least get a modicum
of truth. We are safe in saying that the menace of the predatory gentiles was very serious at this time; that the military
forces of the Kingdom were overtaxed and inadequate; that
the enemy nomads were allowed to trade with the Spaniards;
that the Spaniards lost and won victories, and that some
governors were criminally negligent and incompetent in
their military duties. All this is true, but the fact remains
that the missions and Spanish settlements survived the
ordeal, and this survival could not have been entirely in spite
of the governors.
CONCLUSION

The Franciscan missions of New Mexico by 1750 had
long since passed through their Golden Era, and were sinking gently into a mellow decline, disturbed only by spasmodic
and ineffectual bursts of energy. The padres were looking
backward, not ahead, and were content to bask in the afterglow of deeds long passed. While they concentrated on a
ceaseless pot and kettle polemic with the secular power, the
heathen remained unconverted, the nomad ravaged the land,
and the missions vegetated.

